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CASENOTE
SUPREME COURT DECISION ALLOWS THE EPA TO FLEX ITS MUSCLE
AND TRUMP STATE PERMITTING. AUTHORITIES
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environmental Protection Agency'
1. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may overrule a
state's issuance of a construction permit to a polluting entity if it determines that the state acted unreasonably in
issuing the permit.2 While the Court's holding was based on facts specific to the case, its analysis indicates that
the Court may be moving toward granting administrative agencies such as the EPA considerably more power
and deference than they were previously afforded. Specifically, the decision ignores traditional limitations on
judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, as well as fundamental principles of state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment. This note examines the legal bases for the Court's decision and considers its
possible implications on the future of federal and state cooperation under the Clean Air Act and other statutes
that divide responsibilities between the states and the federal government.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc. (Cominco) is a mining company that operates a zinc concentrate mine in the
northwest corner of Alaska, called the "Red Dog Mine."3 This mine is the largest private employer in the
region, and contributes a quarter of the area's total wages.4 The Red Dog Mine is classified as a "major
emitting facility" under the Clean Air Act (CAA)' and the parallel state regulations. 6 As such, prior to
constructing the mine, Cominco had to acquire a permit from the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (ADEC). 7 In 1988. Cominco obtained a permit authorizing it to operate five 5,000 kilowatt
generators, two of which were to be operated only in a standby capacity.
The CAA and Alaska's parallel state regulations also require the obtainment of a permit prior to any
major pollution-increasing modifications to a facility.9 It is this requirement that is relevant to the present case.
In 1996, Cominco entered into a venture, with funding from the State of Alaska, which would increase its zinc
production by 40 percent.' 0 Because this project required the use of additional generators, and constituted a
1124 S. Ct. 983 (2004) [hereinafter ADEC].
2 Id. See generally infra Part IV.
'1d. at 994.
4 id.
'42.U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000).
6 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 994. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (requiring the obtainment of a permit prior to constructing or
modifying any facility emitting more than 250 tons of nitrogen oxides per year); 18 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.300(c)(1)
(2003) (Alaska's State Implementation Plan (SIP), containing an analogous requirement).
7 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 994.
8 id.
9 Id. at 992. See also 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(23)(i) (2002) (imposing the permit requirement for any modifications that
increase nitrogen oxide emissions more than 40 tons per year); 18 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.300(h)(3)(B)(ii) (2003).
'
0ADEC,124 S. Ct. at 994.
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major pollution-increasing modification under the CAA and the parallel state regulations, Cominco sought to
obtain a permit from ADEC."
As part of the permitting process, the CAA requires state environmental agencies such as ADEC to
determine the "best available control technology" (BACT) relative to the polluting source.12 In turn, the entity
seeking the permit must agree to employ this pollution control before the state agency will authorize
construction or modification of the facility.'3 . In 1999, ADEC proposed that a technology known as selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) was BACT for Cominco's expansion project.14 This control would reduce nitrogen
oxide emissions from the generator(s) it was applied to by 90 percent.' 5
In response to ADEC's proposal, Cominco submitted an amended application proposing a different
control technology-Low NOx-as BACT, and further requesting permission to add an additional (seventh)
16 1 7generator. Low NOx achieves only a 30 percent reduction in nitrogen oxide emissions. ADEC initially
determined that SCR was BACT using the EPA's procedure, which states that the most effective pollution
control must be used, unless the applicant demonstrates that it is infeasible due to technical, energy,
environmental, or economic considerations. At that time, ADEC determined it was technologically,
environmentally, and economically feasible for Cominco to use SCR on the two generators that would be
subject to the BACT requirements.19
In response to this, Cominco proposed an alternative, which would require it to fit all seven of its
generators with the Low NOx controls.2 0 By doing this rather than fitting only two of the generators with SCR,
Cominco urged, it would decrease its total net emissions of nitrogen oxides by 396 tons per year.21 This
calculation rested on the assumption that at least one generator would typically be kept on standby mode; if not,
the alternative would actually increase emissions.22
Convinced that Cominco's proposal would achieve a reduction in emissions equal to or greater than
applying SCR to only two of the generators, ADEC issued a draft permit on May 4, 1999, allowing construction
of the additional generator, and employing Low NOx as BACT.23 However, in July of 1999, the National Parks
Service (NPS) submitted comments to ADEC objecting to Cominco's scheme of offsetting new emissions from
its expansion project by installing pollution controls on generators already in use, which were not subject to
" Id.
12 Id. at 990. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (establishing the BACT requirement).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(5).
14 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 994. SCR involves injecting "ammonia or urea into the exhaust before the exhaust enters a catalyst
bed made with vanadium, titanium, or platinum." Reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions takes place "when the flue gas
passes over the catalyst bed where the NOx and ammonia combine to become nitrogen, oxygen, and water . . . " Id.(citation omitted).
15 Id.
16 Id. Low NOx employs changes to the generator, which "improve fuel atomization and modify the combustion space to
enhancing the mixing of air and fuel." Id. (citation omitted).
17 Id.
8 See id. at 994-95 (citing the EPA's New Source Review Manual B-2 (Draft Oct. 1990). This method is referred to as
the "top-down" method, in which the state agency ranks all available control technologies in descending order relative to
their effectiveness, and then picks as BACT the highest ranked control that is considered "achievable" after considering
technical, energy, environmental, and economic factors.
'9 Id. at 995. The two affected generators are MG-5 (which was being changed from standby status to active use) and
MG-17 (the seventh generator, which was to be newly constructed). See id. at 994.
20 Id. at 995.
21 Iid.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 994.
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BACT requirements.24 NPS also argued that the proposed permit removed operating restrictions on four of
Cominco's existing generators, and as such, those generators should be subject to BACT as well.25
Acting in its capacity as enforcer of the CAA, EPA agreed with NPS and informed ADEC that it could
not offset new emissions by imposing controls on Cominco's other generators, which were not subject to
BACT 26 In response to the EPA comments, ADEC issued a second draft permit, which again listed Low NOx
as BACT.x In so doing, ADEC abandoned the emissions offsetting argument, and agreed with NPS and EPA
that generators not subject to the permit could not be considered in determining BACT for those that were.28
However, it argued (contrary to its May 1999 statements) that SCR would impose "a disproportionate cost" on
Cominco. 29 ADEC further stated that if SCR was required for a rural Alaska utility, prices would increase by
20 percent, and though Cominco had provided no economic data to establish SCR's effect on its own costs,
ADEC concluded that they would be "significantly higher" than with other potential BACTs, such as Low
NOx.30
EPA was unconvinced, and suggested that ADEC provide an economic analysis of the effect of
installing and operating SCR at the Cominco mine.3 Cominco, however, refused to submit financial data,
stating that such an economic analysis was unnecessary, and that it had concerns about confidentiality.32
Nonetheless, in December of 1999, ADEC issued a final permit to Cominco, listing Low NOx as BACT. As
justification for its decision, ADEC declared that using SCR as BACT would have a negative effect on
Cominco's "unique and continuing impact on the economic diversity of the region" and on its "world
competitiveness."33
EPA responded by issuing an order to ADEC under Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 of the CAA3 4
prohibiting issuance of a permit to Cominco unless ADEC provided satisfactory documentary evidence as to
why -SCR was not chosen as BACT. Two months later, EPA issued a second order, this time to Cominco,
prohibiting it from beginning "construction or modification activities at the Red Dog mine."36 In response to
these orders, ADEC and Cominco petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for
judicial review of EPA's actions. After denying EPA's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit decided the case on the merits in favor of EPA on July 30, 2002, holding that it
had acted within its authority under Sections 113(a)(5) and 167.38 The Court stated that Cominco did not
24 Id. at 995.
25 Id. at 996.




30 Id. (citation omitted).
31 Id at 996-97.
32 Id. at 997.
- Id. (citation omitted).
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(5), 7477.
3 ADEC 124 S. Ct. at 997. See also infra nn. 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's authority under §§
I 13(a)(5) and 167 of the CAA).
36 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 997. EPA later withdrew this order and allowed ADEC to conduct limited construction in the
summer of 2000. Id.
3 Id at 998.
38 Id. See Alaska v. U.S. Envil. Protection Agency, 298 F.3d 814, 820-823 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Alaska v. U.S. Envil.
Protection Agency, 244 F.3d 748, 750-751 (9th Cir. 2001) (The preliminary motion to dismiss for lack of subject matterjurisdiction was denied because the Court determined that EPA's order was a final administrative action, subject tojudicial review)).
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"demonstrate that SCR was economically infeasible," and that "ADEC failed to provide a reasoned justification
for its elimination of SCR as a control option."39
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 24, 200340 to determine "the scope of
EPA's authority under §§ 113(a)(5) and 167" of the CAA. 4 1 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that
EPA does have certain supervisory powers over state permitting agencies such as ADEC, and may issue orders
to overrule state-issued construction permits if it finds that the state's BACT selection is unreasonable.42
Specifically, the Court held that EPA was not arbitrary or capricious in finding that ADEC's BACT
determination lacked evidentiary support, and the Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed.43
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act was passed on December 17, 1963 "[t]o improve, strengthen, and accelerate
programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution."4 4 In effect, the CAA expanded the Federal
Government's resources devoted to air quality research, enabled it to financially support state air pollution
reduction efforts, and granted it authority to intervene directly to prevent pollution in certain circumstances.45
Four years later, Con ress increased the Federal Government's role in enforcing the CAA through the Air
Quality Act of 1967. The States, however, retained most of the control over implementing air quality
improvement measures, and moved relatively slowly to do so.47
In response to the States' lackadaisical implementation of the previous Acts, Congress decided to force
the States to take measures to reduce air pollution through the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.48 While the
Amendments purportedly created a "partnership" between the States and the Federal Government in reducing
air pollution, effectually, the Amendments created an ultimatum for the States to meet certain air quality
specifications within a given time period.49
The Amendments required the Administrator of the EPA to create "national ambient air quality
standards" (NAAQS) within 30 days, and further required the states to create and submit plans5 0 for
39ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 998 (citing Alaska, 298 F.3d at 823).
40 Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. Envt. Protection Agency, 537 U.S. 1186 (2003).
' ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 998. Meanwhile, on July 16, 2003, ADEC issued another permit to Cominco, allowing for
construction of the new generator, and listing SCR as BACT, under the proviso that SCR would cease to be BACT if the
U.S. Supreme Court decided this case in favor of ADEC. Id. at 997.
'
2 Id. at 1009.
4 Id.
4 Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 392 (1963).
45 Where the pollution originated in one state but endangered citizens of another state, the Attorney-General could sue the
polluter on behalf of the U.S. However, for air pollution that was solely intrastate, the Federal Government could only aid
in judicial proceedings and the Attorney General could only bring suit upon the request of the Governor of that state.
Train v. Nat/. Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1975).
46 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 485 (1967) ("AN ACT To amend the Clean Air Act to authorize planning grants to air
pollution control agencies; expand research provisions relating to fuels and vehicles; provide for interstate air pollution
control agencies or commissions; authorize the establishment of air quality standards, and for other purposes.").
4 Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
48 See Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
49Id.; Train, 421 U.S. at 64-65.
50 Referred to as State Implementation Plans (SIPs).
271
MELPR, Vol. 11, No. 3
implementing these NAAQS within nine months.5 1 In compliance with this statutory directive, the EPA first
published NAAQS in 1971.52 In 1985, EPA issued the NAAQS for nitrogen dioxide-the pollutant at issue in
ADEC.5 3 Likewise, state environmental agencies began publishing complimentary ambient air quality standards
during this period.54
Though EPA required that states maintain air quality at a certain level, there was initially no requirement
that states with pollution levels already in compliance with NAAQS had to maintain those levels.ss -In response
to this (as well as a court order), EPA set forth regulations requiring all SIPs to have permitting procedures for
the creation of new polluting sources in areas where pollution levels were lower than the NAAQS required (so-
called "attainment areas").56 These regulations, roughly encoded by Congress through its 1977 amendments to
the CAA, call for states to require a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit prior to the
construction or modification of any "major emitting facility" within the designated area.5 8 A "major emitting
facility" included any source emitting more than 250 tons of any air pollutant (such as nitrogen oxide) per
year. 9
Specifically, the CAA provides that the owner or operator of such a facility will only be granted a permit
if he or she can show that the facility will not create air pollution that is greater than: (1) the "maximum
allowable increase . . . or concentration" for any area under the PSD plan more than once a year, (2) the
NAAQS in any attainment area affected, or (3) any other emission standard under the CAA.60 In addition to
meeting these requirements. the CAA also requires that a polluting entity use the "best available control
technology" (BACT) for the particular pollutant involved with the new or modified source.
BACT is defined as:
an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to
regulation under [the CAA] emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility,
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (2000) & 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000), respectively; see also General Motors Corp. v.
US., 496 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1990).52ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 991 (citing Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 251 (1976)).Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 50.11 (2002), entitled "National primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for nitrogen
dioxide," states: "(a) The level of the national primary ambient air quality standard for nitrogen dioxide is 0.053 parts per
million (100 micrograms per cubic meter), annual arithmetic mean concentration. (b) The level of national secondary
ambient air quality standard for nitrogen dioxide is 0.053 parts per million (100 micrograms per cubic meter), annual
arithmetic mean concentration." Id.
5 See e.g. 18 Alaska Admin. Code § 50.010(5). Note that the Alaska regulation simply reiterates the federal mandate:
"The standards for concentrations of contaminants in the ambient air ... are established as follows: . . . (5) for nitrogen
dioxide: annual arithmetic mean of 100 micrograms per cubic meter . . ." Id.
" William B. Johnson, Application of § 165 of Clean Air Act, Pertaining to Preconstruction Requirements for Prevention
of Signficant Deterioration, to Particular Emission Sources, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 255, § 2 (1988).
SId.; 40 C.F.R. § 52.2 1(a)(2) (1975) states: "(iii) No new major stationary source or major modification to which the
requirements of paragraphs () through (r)(5) of this section apply shall begin actual construction without a permit that
states that the major stationary source or major modification will meet those requirements. The Administrator has
authority to issue any such permit." Id. The permitting requirements applied to new sources in both attainment and
"unclassifiable" areas (areas that cannot be classified as meeting or not meeting NAAQS on the basis of available
information). ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 992.
* See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (2000).
8 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
* 42 'U.S.C. § 7479(1); See also ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 992 (noting that any modification increasing nitrogen oxide
emissions more than 40 tons per year also requires a permit). Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(23)(i) (2002)).6o 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3).
61 Id. at (a)(4).
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which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility
through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques ...
for control of each such pollutant.6
Further, the CAA states that the BACT must never exceed the emissions allowed by any of the other standards
set forth by the EPA or through the SIPs.63
Where the State fails to require a polluting entity to utilize BACT or any other PSD directive, the EPA
has two similar enforcement provisions it may use under the CAA. First, under Section 113 of the Act, if the
State "is not acting in compliance with any requirement or prohibition . . . relating to the construction of new
sources or the modification of existing sources," the EPA may issue a stop-construction order, prohibiting any
work on the facility.64 Second, under Section 167 of the Act, the EPA may take appropriate measures (such as
issuing an order or injunction) "to prevent the construction or modification of a major emitting facility which
does not conform to the [PSD] requirements."6 5 Though these provisions seem facially almost identical,
Section 113 applies only to the State and its failure to act in compliance with the CAA, while Section 167
enables the EPA to issue an order to the polluting entity itself.66
These statutory provisions not only authorize the EPA to take action, they have been interpreted to
actually compel EPA action in some instances. For instance, in Save the Valley Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, the Court
held that where a polluting entity exceeds what it is authorized to do under the PSD Permit, the EPA must issue
a stop-construction order to prevent further activity beyond the bounds of the permit. Though this would
seemingly give the EPA great power over state environmental agencies, the Agency has consistently conceded
that the primary responsibility for enforcing the requirements of the CAA rests on the States.68 Thus, the
question has been somewhat murky as to what degree of power the EPA should have in this ever-tedious
balance between protecting local social and economic interests, and furthering national environmental efforts.
B. Limitations on the EPA 's Power Under the CAA
There are two major sources that define and/or limit the power of the EPA other than the various
environmental statutes, such as the CAA. These are worth discussing briefly.
1. Chevron Deference
The United States Supreme Court defined the amount and type of deference that should be afforded to
an administrative agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute in its landmark decision, Chevron USA, Inc. v.
62 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). For a description of the EPA-approved method of choosing BACT. see supra n. I 8 and
accompanying text.
That is, any standards, such as NAAQS, promulgated under 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411 & 7412.
6 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)(A).
6' 42 U.S.C. § 7477.
6 Note that Section 113 refers only to when the State does not fulfill its requirements, such as issuing permits, enforcing
compliance with SIPs, etc. (regardless of whether environmental standards are met), while Section 167 focuses on the
facility itself and whether it conforms with the PSD requirements.
6 565 F. Supp. 709, 710 (D.D.C. 1983); Johnson, supra n. 55.
6 See 40 C.F.R. § 52 (2002) (". . . states have the primary role in administering and enforcing the various components of
the PSD program. States have been largely successful in this effort, and EPA's involvement in interpretative and
enforcement issues is limited to only a small number of cases"); See also ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 1012 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting).
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National Resources Defense Council, Inc.69 In Chevron, the Court laid out a two step process by which courts
should decide this issue.70 First, the court must determine whether Congress has directly addressed the issue
(i.e., is the statute self-explanatory?.71 If the statute is unambiguous, then no deference is afforded to the
agency's interpretation.72 If Congress has not addressed the issue, or the. statute is ambiguous as to the question
at hand, courts must consider "whether the agency's answer is based on a ermissible construction of the
statute."3 If so, the court must defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation.
Though Chevron deference is clearly expansive and applies in most agency interpretations of statutes,
the Court subsequently made clear that such deference does not apply to interpretations that are not subject to
procedural safeguards such as judicial review.7 5 In Christensen v. Harris County, the Court considered whether
an agency's interpretation of a statute in the form of a letter from the Department of Labor was entitled to
Chevron deference. The Court held that "[i]nterpretations such . as those in opinion letters-like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference."77  The Court has been relatively unclear in its
application of what deference agency interpretations are afforded when not subject to actual Chevron
deference. 8 Nonetheless, prior to ADEC, it had consistently held that several factors, including thoroughness
of an agency's consideration of the issue, consistency in application, and the agency's unique ability to make
such determinations, must be considered before granting deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute. 79
2. State Sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment
While the Supreme Court has had an infamous and somewhat conflicted history with the Tenth
Amendment,80 its recent jurisprudence has signified a rebirth of that amendment's guarantee of state
81828
sovereignty. In New York v. United States, and Printz v. United States, for instance, the Court struck down
statutory provisions that imposed the burden of implementing a federal statute on the state governments. In
69 467 U.S. 837 (1984).70oId. at 842-43.
7' Id.!
72 Id.
* Id. at 843.
74 Id. The Court made this clear in the following oft-quoted phrase: . . . a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id.
7s Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
76 Id. at 580-81.
n Id. at 587.
78 Compare Wash. State Dept. of Soc. & Health.Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)
(holding that an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute that is not subject to the strictures of formal rulemaking
or adjudication still "warrant[s] respect.") and Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (holding that an "internal agency
guideline, which is akin to an 'interpretive rule' that 'does not require notice and comment,"' is entitled to "some
deference since it is a 'permissible construction of the statute') (internal citations omitted) to U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 231-232 (2001) (holding that certain agency interpretations may have precedential value within the agency, but
might not receive the sort of deference indicated by Chevron due to their lack of procedural safeguards) (emphasis added).
79 See generally id.; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1944).
8o For a fuller disposition of this history, see Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 1601 (2002).
8 See id. at 1601.
82 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
83 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
8 See also Gey, supra n. 80, at 1645-50.
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New York, the Court considered a federal statute that divided the control of low-level radioactive waste between
the state and federal government. The statute created a complicated regulatory scheme by which the federal
government would offer monetary assistance, among other incentives, to states that had, or chose to create,
waste disposal sites within their boundaries, or entered into compacts with other states that did.86 The statute
also created a requirement that if states with no disposal sites did not develop one by a certain date, they would
be required to "take title" to the waste, thereby becoming liable for any damage caused by the radioactive
waste. The Court said that this last provision violated the Tenth Amendment because it forced the states to
choose between taking title to the waste and regulating according to Congress's will.8 8 It regarded this as
"coercion" rather than merely "encouragement," which the Court had historically allowed.89 Specifically, the
Court stated that "[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of
intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to
the require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions." 90
Indeed, even in Reno v. Condon,9 1 a decision upholding a federal privacy statute requiring states to "take
administrative and sometimes legislative action," 92 the Court implied that an analysis of Tenth Amendment
concerns was necessary to validate the constitutionality of a statute. 93 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's recent
trend toward giving teeth to the Tenth Amendment has been predominantly limited to cases where Congress has
"commandeered" a state or its officials in carrying out federal statutes.94 None of these cases make it clear how
the Tenth Amendment might apply to cases where a federal agency commandeers the functions of state
agencies that are acting to fulfill their duties under a federal statute, as is alleged in ADEC.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The central issue the Supreme Court decided in this case is whether EPA should be allowed to overrule a
state-issued permit if it believes that the state's BACT determination is unreasonable. 95 While both EPA and
ADEC agreed that Sections I 13(a)(5) and 167 of the CAA confer upon the EPA the duty of ensuring that state-
issued construction permits contain a BACT requirement, they disagreed as to whether the CAA allows EPA to
intervene when a state has included a BACT requirement, but EPA determines that it is unreasonable. 96 EPA
argued that this power is necessary to further the policies Congress set forth when it drafted the CAA.97 ADEC
countered that to permit this would be to strip from the states a power Congress explicitly designated to them,
and to allow the EPA to effectively impose on a state whatever BACT it feels is most appropriate. 98
8 N Y. 505 U.S. at 150-54.86 id.
* Id. at 153-54. That is, the companies that created the waste would not be liable-the states would. Id.
" Id. at 175-76.
89 Id.
9
' Id. at 162.
9' 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
92 Id. at 150-51 (quoting S.C. v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
9 See id. at 149 (citing Printz and New York and stating that a determination that the federal government may regulate a
certain subject matter does not vitiate Tenth Amendment sovereignty concerns).
94 McConnell v. Federal Election Comnn., 124 S. Ct. 619, 685 (2003).
9 5ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 999.
96 Id. at 999-1000.
9' Id. at 1000.
9 Id. at 1001-03.
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A. EPA'sArguments
EPA's position was that the CAA requires not only a BACT determination, but one that furthers the
policies Congress intended to support in enacting the statute. 99 It argued that because the statute requires the
state permitting authority to establish a BACT that results in "maximum" emissions reduction in light of
"energy, environmental, and economic impacts, and other costs," states have limited discretion in determining
BACT.'0 It further interpreted Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 of the CAA to empower it to prevent states from
abusing that discretion by creating unreasonably lenient BACT determinations, which might, in turn, encourage
other states to lower their standards in an effort to remain as attractive to industry as less demanding states.' 0'
EPA noted that it has consistently interpreted its duties and power under the CAA, particularly as it
applies to BACT determinations. 102 It reiterated its position that it would intervene only in cases where the state
permitting agency failed to give "a reasoned justification for the basis of its decision."o 3 It further argued that
it was entitled to "Chevron deference" regarding agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.104
B. ADEC's Arguments
ADEC interpreted Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 and other relevant provisions of the CAA quite
differently. According to ADEC, the. CAA explicitly and unambiguously grants the state permitting authority
exclusive power to determine the appropriate BACT.10  Under this interpretation, the EPA should only be
allowed to exercise its enforcement powers where a state has failed to include any BACT requirement in a
construction permit.'o0 According to ADEC, when the state permitting authority does make a BACT
determination and includes the BACT requirement in the permit, EPA should not be allowed to intervene and
force the state to conform to its own BACT determination.' 0 7
In support of this argument, ADEC cited 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(8), which delineates certain instances
where EPA approval of a state's BACT determination is required before construction begins. 8 ADEC
reasoned that if Congress had intended for EPA to be able to intervene in all BACT determinations, it would
have been unnecessary for it to list certain types of cases where EPA approval of the state's BACT
determination is required.'0 9
ADEC also argued that even if the CAA does require that a state's BACT determination be reasonable,
the proper venue for reviewing a state agency's decisions is by way of the state's court system, not by
administrative fiat.i"0 That way, the reviewing body would be able to have a full factual record,' and EPA
would have to carry the burden of persuasion whenever it chose to challenge a BACT determination."l2 ADEC
99 Id.
'oo Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)).
101 Id.
10 2 Id. at 1001.
103 Id. (citations omitted).
1o4 Respt.'s Br., 2002 U.S..Briefs 658. *40-43 (July 16, 2003).
'
0 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
'
6 Id. at 1002.
107 Id.
0 8 Id. at 1003.
1o9 Id.
"
0 Id. at 1003-04; see also id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
This argument assumes, of course, that the discovery procedures in state court would provide a much more detailed
record than that which EPA utilized in this case.
"
2 Id. at 1004.
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argued that these due process requirements would not be met under the EPA's proffered enforcement
mechanism." 3 Lastly, ADEC argued that its arrangement with Cominco, whereby Cominco would employ
Low NOx on all of its generators, would actually decrease overall emissions, which, after all, is the purpose of
the CAA.114
C. The Majority Opinion
Justice Ginsburg delivered the majority opinion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
and Breyer.' 5 The majority quickly accepted EPA's interpretation of the relevant statutes as they relate to its
oversight role.11 6 Its analysis focused on discrediting ADEC's claims'"7 and determining whether EPA's
actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law" under
the APA." 8 While the Court did reject EPA's argument that its statutory interpretation should be afforded
Chevron deference because it was merely "internal guidance memoranda," it nonetheless stated that EPA's
interpretation warranted respect. 19
The Court found that EPA's actions were not an abuse of discretion under the APA.120 The Court
criticized ADEC's seemingly indecisive application of the top-down approach to BACT determination.121 It
also admonished ADEC for making claims that Cominco would suffer great economic loss if it was required to
use SCR without having made any determination of the actual financial impact on Cominco of employing
SCR.122 The Court was unconvinced by ADEC's analogy to the costs a rural utility company would incur if it
employed SCR, and held that EPA was justified in finding that ADEC's BACT determination was unreasonable
in light of the rather scant evidence of economic infeasibility. 23
The Court spent considerably more time addressing ADEC's arguments. First, it discounted ADEC's
assessment that the CAA granted state permitting authorities exclusive authority to determine BACT.124 While
it admitted that the state had the initial responsibility of making BACT determinations, it was unconvinced that
these determinations could not be deemed unreasonable and therefore be overruled by the EPA in the exercise
of its oversight authority under §§ 11 3(a)(5) and 167.125 The Court noted that the EPA has "explicit and
sweeping authority to enforce CAA 'requirements' relating to the construction and modification of [polluting
sources]." 26 The Court therefore declared that EPA may intervene where a state's decision as to BACT is "not
based on a reasoned analysis." 27
" Id.; see also Pet.'s Oral Argument, 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 52, **14-15 (Oct. 8, 2003).
114 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 1008.
.s Id. at 989.
"
6 See id at 1001.
" See id. at 1001-05.
" See id. at 1006-09. The APA's standard for review of agency action is encoded at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). i.
"
9 Id. at 1001.
2o Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1006-07. Recall that ADEC initially determined that SCR was BACT, but then changed its determination to
allow for an alternative solution, and further changed its reasoning in response to EPA's criticism of the emissions off-
setting approach. See supra nn. 19-30 and accompanying text.
122 Id. at 1007.
113 See id. at 1007-08, 1009. The Court noted that EPA freely stated that ADEC was welcome to reopen the issue of
BACT determination if it could show some hard evidence that SCR was economically infeasible. Id. at 1009.
124 Id. at 1002-03
125 id.
126 Id. at 1002.
127 Id. at 1003 (citation omitted).
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The Court next addressed ADEC's argument that if Congress had intended for all BACT determinations
to be reviewable by EPA, it would not have created a separate class of cases where EPA approval of BACT was
required.128 The Court stated that although in certain cases EPA approval is required by the CAA, it does not
follow that in all other cases EPA is precluded from issuing any stop construction orders where the state BACT
determination is unreasonable.129 It further noted that there is a "difference between a statutory requirement
and a statutory authorization."' 3 0
The Court also rejected ADEC's argument that the proper venue for review of a state's BACT
determination is in the state's court system.131 It refused to read into the statute a scheme that would relegate an
agency charged with enforcing federal law to state court alone.132 It was equally unconvinced by ADEC's due
process concerns, finding that requiring a state agency to challenge EPA's decision in federal court would not
unfairly shift the burdens of persuasion and production, or provide an inadequate record for review.1 33
Lastly, the Court dismissed ADEC's contention that its BACT determination was reasonable because it
would result in lower emissions. 1 34 Although Cominco agreed to employ Low NOx on all of its generators,
rather than just those relevant to the permit it was seeking, the Court held that these other generators could not
be considered as a single emissions "bubble."' 35 Only those generators subject to the present permit action
could be considered together.' 3 6 Thus, although the arrangement between Cominco and ADEC made practical
sense, the Court held that it is simply not permitted under the CAA.137
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the dissenting opinion, and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia and Thomas.138 The dissent takes issue with the majority's statutory interpretation. It notes that the
statute specifically states that the state permitting authority determines BACT.139 The dissent further states that
Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 should be read together with the rest of the CAA.140  In other words, the
enforcement provisions should only be invoked when the state permitting agency has failed to meet a specific
statutory requirement. 141 The dissent concluded that since ADEC made a BACT determination, and weighed
the express statutory factors, it fulfilled its statutory requirement, and EPA was not authorized to invoke the
enforcement provisions. 42
The dissent argued that the CAA provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrary and capricious BACT
determinations outside EPA's enforcement provisions. 143 Specifically, the CAA dictates that a state's permit
128 id
129 id.
130 Id. (internal citations omitted).
' Id. at 1004.
132 id.
131 Id. at 1004-05.
134 Id. at 1008.
s Id. at 1008-09.
116 Id. at 1009.
1 Id. at 1008-09.
118Id. at 1010.
139 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (stating that BACT is what "the permitting authority, . . . taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts, and other costs, determines is achievable" for a given facility).
140 ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 1011.
14 See id. (noting that ADEC's determination that Low NOx is BACT does not violate any specific CAA requirements).
14 2 Id. at 1011-12.
143 Id. at 1012-13.
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program must provide "an opportunity for state judicial review."144 More importantly, the dissent was
concerned with several due process issues raised by ADEC. It was particularly worried about the shifting of the
initial burden of pleading from the EPA to the State.14 5 If the EPA was allowed to issue stop orders effectively
overruling state BACT determinations, the State would be forced to challenge the order in federal court.146 if,
however, the EPA was not allowed to issue stop construction orders by fiat, but rather was required to initiate a
civil action in state court, the burden of pleading would be on the EPA. 47 According to the dissent, Congress
intended to grant the states-being more able to "strike the right balance between preserving environmental
quality and advancing competing objectives"-the primary responsibility of enforcing the CAA and specifically
of determining BACTs.14 8 And, as such, the dissent opined that the burden should be on EPA to bring an action
in state court and prove that the state agency's determination was arbitrary and capricious-not the other way
around. 149
Lastly, the dissent took issue with the majority's Chevron analysis. 50 The dissent notes that although
the majority states that Chevron deference is not appropriate for an "internal guidance memoranda," it adopts
EPA's statutory interpretation without question and, in essence, grants it Chevron deference "in fact."' 5' In
concluding, the dissent warns that the majority opinion may open the door to unbridled federal oversight,
whereby any and all state action could be overridden by federal agency mandate.152
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court's decision may indicate a shift away from its recent trend of broadening state
sovereignty. To say the least, this case indicates a preference for federal supervision of CAA enforcement.
Moreover, the Court not only gave the EPA direct power to overrule state environmental agencies' actions it
deems unreasonable, it also granted substantial deference to the EPA's interpretation(s) of the CAA itself.
Perhaps this case indicates that state sovereignty is, indeed, a "myth." 5 3
First, the Court gives the EPA direct authority to overrule a state's BACT determination. 54 Wile the
Court notes that the CAA permits the EPA to issue stop construction orders when a state does not comply with




'" Id. at 10 12.
'4 See id. at 1018 (stating that 'federal agencies cannot consign States to the ministerial tasks of information gathering
and making initial recommendations, while reserving to themselves the authority to make final judgments under the guise
of surveillance and oversight"). The dissent raises three additional concerns relative to this point: First, if the initial
burden of pleading is shifted to the State, what assurance does the State have that it will not also bear the burdens of
persuasion and production? Id. at 1014. Second, what is to say that EPA will not use the power the majority has given
them to overturn state action that has already been reviewed and deemed reasonable by the state court, thereby creating
serious separation of powers issues? See id. at 1015. Third, what prevents EPA from setting aside a BACT determination
years after it is made, since oversight power is necessarily after the fact? Id. at 1016.
so Id. at 1018.
151 Id.
52 Id.
'5 See generally Gey, supra n. 80.
'1 See supra nn. 124-27.
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the specific provisions related to new sources and source modifications,' 5 5 it does not point out where in the
statute it found Congressional intent to allow the EPA to overrule state action in conformity with the CAA when
it determines that such action is unreasonable. Indeed, this decision may allow federal administrative agencies
to overrule any parallel state agency's decision(s) or action(s) they happen to disagree with.
To say the least, such practice would fly in the face of the Tenth Amendment. As previously mentioned,
the Tenth Amendment has had a tumultuous history-being at times a very powerful tool for the states or the
people to fight "big government," and at other times, nearly dead-in recent years the Amendment has been
frequently cited by the Court in striking down improper federal usurpation of state powers.' 5 6 This decision
indicates a shift in the opposite direction. Here, the Majority's analysis does not even address Tenth
Amendment concerns, and even Kennedy's dissent only briefly mentions the issue in its conclusion. 5 7
Perhaps the Court sees a distinction between a "power" of the state as opposed to a "task" delegated to
the state. Nonetheless, the Court has previously applied the Tenth Amendment to areas of the law in which the
state and federal governments "share" power through the delegation of certain tasks to the state government and
others to the federal government. It seems strange that the Court would now turn completely away from its
precedent without even discussing it. Perhaps, instead, the Court feels that the Tenth Amendment should only
apply to statutes that specifically coerce the state into abiding by a federal regulatory scheme and not to federal
agency action that achieves the same result. However, that distinction also seems superficial at best. The Tenth
Amendment does not differentiate between executive and legislative power.159
Equally disconcerting is the amount of deference the Majority gives to EPA's interpretation of the CAA.
As Justice Kennedy states in his dissent, the Majority in one breath states that Chevron deference does not
apply, but in the very next grants the EPA Chevron deference in deciding the case. 160 Although Chevron has
been applied with 6reat breadth,161 the Court has explicitly held that it only applies to agency actions that have
the force of law.' 6 Yet, here the Court accepts the EPA's statutory interpretation without stating why it is
reasonable.' 63 To do so may open the door to the Court accepting an agency's interpretation of a statute without
considering its reasonableness, and then turning around and upholding the agency's determination that a state's
* Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (stating that the EPA may act to stop construction when "a State is not acting in
compliance with any requirement or prohibition of the chapter relating to the construction of new sources or the
modification ofexisting sources").
56 See Gey, supra n. 80, at 1643-44 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), N.Y v. US., 505 U.S. 144 (1992),
and Printz v. US., 521 U.S. 898 (1997), as examples of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring state sovereignty).
Note, however, that Gey is not convinced that these cases show a true return to state sovereignty principles-rather, he
sees them as limiting but not prohibiting the federal government from imposing its policies on the states. Id. at 1644.
'" See ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 999-1009; see also id. at 1018 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (noting that the Court's decision could
undermine states' sovereignty as defined in cases such as N. Y v. US., 505 U.S. at 167, and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999)).
' See N. Y., 505 U.S. at 175 (considering a federal statute dividing the responsibility of controlling the disposal of low-
level radioactive waste between the states and the federal government. The Court held that federal action
"commandeer[ing] state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes . . . [is] inconsistent with the
Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments"); see also supra nn. 85-90 and accompanying
text.
1 See U.S. Const. amend. X.
' ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 1018.
161 See e.g. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186. (granting Chevron deference to the Department of Health and Human
Services even though the regulations in question "reverse[d] a longstanding agency policy") (citation omitted).
162 See ADEC, 124 S. Ct. at 1001 (stating that Chevron does not apply to "policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines") (citations omitted).
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action was unreasonable. Surely this double standard could greatly increase federal agencies' power and
completely vitiate the sovereignty of complimentary state agencies.
Perhaps the greatest concern here is one of policy. ADEC, a state agency acting on behalf of the people
of the State of Alaska, came to its BACT determination after meeting extensively with Teck Cominco over a
period of three years.16 The parties developed a BACT solution using that would actually create lower
emissions than the Low NOx control initially proposed by ADEC.16 5 This determination, made by a state
agency that is infinitely more in tune with the local economic climate and other extrinsic factors, should not
have been disrupted absent a showing that the objectives of the CAA were not met.
By focusing on the strictures of EPA policy determination, the Court overlooks the bigger picture-the
CAA was enacted to reduce air pollution in America. To be so inflexible as to require complete adherence to
the EPA's chosen method of BACT determination, regardless of the fact that Congress specifically delegated
the task to the states, is to completely thwart the purpose of the statute. ADEC exemplifies this. Through this
decision, the EPA, which is charged with being the federal government's guardian of the environment, has
succeeded in enforcing an emissions control measure that will actually cause greater emissions than that
proposed by the polluting entity and approved by the State. Perhaps this is why Congress had the foresight to
leave most of the burden of implementing the CAA with the states. More importantly, this is certainly why the
Constitution of the United States was amended to state that those powers not specifically granted to the federal
government "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.", 66
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unclear what effect the Supreme Court's decision in ADEC will have. Potentially, it could extend
Chevron deference to agency interpretations not subject to any procedural safeguards, and also send the Tenth
Amendment once again into oblivion. On the other hand, it may be that the Court's holding will be viewed as
limited to the facts of the case, or at least to cases where a state acts in a grossly arbitrary manner, pandering to
the will of big business without requiring it to substantiate its claims of economic damage, as the Court seemed
to think ADEC did. Either way, the Court's decision has to be seen as a victory for federal agencies. After all,
even a very narrow interpretation of the holding still concedes that federal agencies may overrule state agency
action they deem unreasonable without Congress specifically permitting them to do so. Whether this decision
signifies the first tumble down the proverbial slippery slope remains to be seen.
PATRICK A. BOUSQUET
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" See id. at 994-95.
161 Id. at 995.
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